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From compromises of some of the world’s largest corporations, to critical 
vulnerabilities in widely used open source software, to exponential growth  
in the number of connected devices and users, the need to proactively 
design policies and practices to secure users and Internet infrastructure 
has never been greater. Yet, cybersecurity public policy conversations too 
often are siloed and grounded in a few old ideas that don’t encompass the 
totality of the threat landscape. As a result, the state of cybersecurity policy 
today does not have a compelling answer for global-scale vulnerabilities  
like Heartbleed or nation-state attacks on public and private sector actors.  
The concern for cybersecurity from all stakeholders has only been growing, 
but cybersecurity policy remains a broad and contested field lacking clarity 
on the best paths forward.
To help cut through the rhetoric and identify consensus on areas of 
cybersecurity policy that should be prioritized for further attention and 
investment, Mozilla brought together more than thirty leading cybersecurity 
experts from a wide variety of backgrounds: academia, civil liberties, 
government and military, security, and technology.
Amid a plethora of definitions of cybersecurity, often leading to different 
policy and practical interventions, our participants converged on the 
essential technical core: the confidentiality, integrity, and availability  
of information. An immediate implication of this finding is that traditional 
government cybersecurity paradigms that focus heavily on securing critical 
infrastructure should shift and expand to consider a much wider array of 
connected users and devices, types of actors, and types of risk. Framing 
this definition properly also matters: our participants noted that elements 
of human rights (especially privacy) and economics belong at the core of a 
balanced and comprehensive view of cybersecurity.
Focusing on users and securing their experience online is a critical part  
of this expanded understanding of cybersecurity. Much can be done to help 
the average person make the right security choices, but our participants 
also identified the need to automate security and enable security by default 
as much as possible. For instance, in the case of cryptography, four times 
as many experts wanted to make tools easier or automatic for the average 
person, as opposed to solutions oriented towards teaching people about 
cryptography and how to use encryption tools.
Participants repeatedly highlighted the state of cryptography as an area 
requiring more attention and priority, and pointed specifically to such needs 
as: increasing the ubiquity of cryptography, making secure cryptographic 
tools easier to use, strengthening the integrity of public key infrastructure, 
as well as developing and deploying alternative means of authentication 
other than passwords. Our experts found a number of such objectives to be 
highly desirable, but not necessarily feasible (and vice versa). However, one 
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recommendation for government action that stood out above the others as 
both highly desirable and highly feasible was greater funding to maintain the 
security of free and open source software.
Building norms for acceptable behavior online was also a popular priority for 
government action in cybersecurity, and to our surprise, arose in all segments 
of the panel. Participants felt that cybersecurity norms should apply to 
governments as well as to others stakeholders, and noted that corporations 
should be concerned about and involved in normative development 
efforts. Again, framing is important: our experts noted that human rights 
should guide the building of cybersecurity norms, and norms should be 
communicated and shared clearly and openly in the international arena.
Cybersecurity conversations are often dominated by three specific topics: 
cryptography, information sharing, and critical infrastructure. We call these 
the “cyberelephants” – the well chartered waters of the issue, and oldest 
and most common topics of governmental conversations on cybersecurity. 
Privacy-respecting information sharing policies, efficacious critical 
infrastructure protection, and widespread availability and understanding 
of secure encryption programs are all hard goals to achieve despite their 
critical importance for the state of security in the digital world. This is why 
those issues are ranked high on desirability despite their implementation 
challenges. Yet, throughout this study we found that the focus on these 
“cyberelephants” tended to obfuscate the other levers, problems,  
and priorities in cybersecurity policy that merit further attention and 
investment, many of which we’ve already identified here.
A closing word on the study’s research methodology: in order to identify 
consensus across our experts’ different backgrounds and expertise, 
and to encourage more constructive approaches, we created a tailored 
methodology based on the Delphi method. The Delphi method, originally 
developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, engages experts 
throughout iterative rounds of pseudonymous contributions. Pseudonymity 
encourages good ideas to succeed on their merits, stripping them from 
reputational effects and force of personality.
 
Through a multistage process including three rounds of surveys and 
intermediary online discussions, the Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi Project 
improved our understanding of the different perspectives and priorities 
in cybersecurity policy, helped us identify where consensus could emerge 
and where conversations are likely to get stuck, and generated a list of 36 
policy suggestions (see Appendix A) using a variety of approaches and levers 
including legal tools, new laws and regulations, technological fixes, and 
research. This report summarizes the insights from this study, but it is not an 
exhaustive report on all cybersecurity issues. Rather, it is meant to be a first 
step towards a more open, holistic, and collaborative policy conversation.
Many thanks to our expert participants and research team for helping  
to improve our understanding of the cybersecurity policy landscape,  
which we hope will lead to a more informed global public debate.
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What is a Delphi 
study & who 
participated 
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The Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi engaged a group of cybersecurity experts from diverse 
backgrounds to discuss the state of cybersecurity policy and identify areas of consensus on 
policies and practices that warrant priority in the global debate and further investment. 
What is a Delphi?
The Delphi method is an iterative  
process (repeated in multiple steps)  
usually involving a group of experts to 
reach consensus on a complex issue.  
It is an effective method when experts are 
likely to come from different perspectives 
and to disagree based on their backgrounds 
and localized sets of priorities. The 
technique uses a pseudonymous format 
that encourages more candid feedback, 
allows all individuals in the group to speak 
freely, without judgment, and gives equal 
weight to each individual’s opinion based 
on its merits rather than lending undue 
influence to verbal or physical presence  
or the reputation of the speaker.  
The objective is to reach some degrees  
of consensus through a process of 
identifying common opinions among  
the group. 
Has this been done before,  
and what are the key steps?
The Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi Project 
is the first study that we know of to 
undertake a Delphi-inspired process to 
tackle cybersecurity issues. Three online 
surveys form the backbone of the Mozilla 
Cybersecurity Delphi, each accompanied by 
rounds of participatory discussion allowing 
experts to engage each other 
 on earlier findings and to reflect on the 
shared responses. The iterative nature 
of the process provides experts with 
opportunities to validate their responses  
or to shift perspectives and priorities based 
on comments and aggregated feedback 
from others on the panel. A key element  
of the study was to engage participants 
with different perspectives arising from 
different “segments” (i.e., academia, civil 
liberties, government & military, security, 
and technology), including some that may 
have opposing views on cybersecurity 
issues and solutions. Another important 
element was transparency of the process. 
To this end, there was little  
Delphi process
1 32Broad survey on the definition of cybersecurity, 
issues, priorities and topics 
that should be addressed
Iterative round and feedback 
loop on the role of government 
in cybersecurity
Pseudonymous discussion 
on the role of government 
in cybersecurity through the 
lens of the 2014 Sony Hack
54 6Suggestion of policies to address priorities identified 
and ranked by experts
Ranking of experts’ suggested 
priorities for government 
action in cybersecurity 
Ranking of policy 
suggestions by desirability 
and feasibility
to no elimination or combining of priorities 
or suggestions. Throughout the research 
process, participants engaged with long 
and diverse lists of issues, wide-ranging 
comments, opinions, and information.  
The multistage process of expert 
engagement included the steps below:  
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How did the project start,  
and what were participants  
asked to do?
The first step was open in nature and 
included asking the expert panel 17 
open-ended questions about their 
understanding of cybersecurity as well as 
the policy levers and priorities for a more 
secure digital world. This served as the 
foundation for soliciting both broad and 
specific information about the definition 
of cybersecurity, the role of government 
in cybersecurity, current vulnerabilities, 
and perceived threats. Our experts 
elaborated on what changes to individual 
computer systems would have the biggest 
impact on cybersecurity, whether they 
believe government should or should 
not be involved in certain areas, what 
cybersecurity topic gets too much or not 
enough attention, etc. A follow-up step 
framed the responses into a list of core 
issues, where experts were asked to review 
the summarized items, provide feedback 
and/or adjust their responses and priorities, 
and to rate the list of issues with an eye 
toward cybersecurity policy suggestions or 
ideas. At this point, outcomes and priorities 
began forming, leading to a long list of 
policy suggestions developed by our panel. 
Again, participants had an opportunity  
to provide feedback and add to the list.  
The final step asked the experts to rank the 
full list of cybersecurity policy suggestions 
based on desirability and feasibility.
What are the limits of a  
Delphi method?
This initiative is not meant to be a 
comprehensive study of all cyber related 
policy issues, or to fully represent the 
various industry segments in the study 
or the diversity of expert opinions in 
the space, but rather to build some level 
of expert consensus using an open and 
multistage process. And since there is no 
“standard” number for what constitutes  
an adequate sample for Delphi, it is  
often difficult to determine what size  
is acceptable for a panel, or for any 
analysis. The Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi 
process was time consuming as we 
moved throughout the iterative stage and 
we are truly grateful for the continuous 
engagement and participation of all  
our participants.
Who participated in the Delphi?
The Delphi included 32 leading 
cybersecurity experts from the US  
and abroad (see participant bios in 
Appendix D). We grouped participants 
into broad industry segments based on 
their background and affiliations. The 
segment labels are not intended to define 
our participants, and they also do not do 
justice to the wide-ranging diversity and 
interdisciplinary nature of our participants’ 
work. By grouping participants, we sought  
to analyze issues as popular across 
segments or contained within segments. 
The five segments are:  
 Academia 
 Civil Liberties 
 Government and Military 
 Security 
 Technology
Again, we wish to thank our 32 experts  
for their participation in this unique project, 
and for their continued engagement 
throughout this multistage study.
6 Security
7 Technology
6 Academia
8 Government + Military
Experts by industry segment
5 Civil Liberties
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Agreeing  
on terms: defining 
cybersecurity
 
“Cybersecurity is freedom from fear of attack - 
unauthorized access or use of one’s identity, data, 
network or system - by anyone, for any reason,  
in any way.”
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The graphic above displays the key words  
used by experts in defining cybersecurity.  
The larger the word, the more often that  
word was mentioned in the definition. 
Step one in a good policy conversation 
is agreeing on the goals and terms of the 
debate. More often than not, cybersecurity 
yields a lot of talking past each other, to the 
extent that some wonder if cybersecurity 
isn’t a Humpty Dumpty word:
“When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said,  
in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just 
what I choose it to mean — neither more 
nor less.” -Lewis Carroll, Alice Through  
the Looking Glass
The common discourse around 
cybersecurity may often be confused  
and may stretch definitions to encompass 
a wide range of cyber incidents from 
crimes, to negligence, to wars and data 
breaches. But our participants, despite 
their varied backgrounds and perspectives, 
achieved significant consensus on how to 
conceptualize cybersecurity. Specifically, 
our experts viewed confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information as the key 
technical components of cybersecurity. 
Fourteen of twenty-nine respondents 
mentioned these three elements when we 
asked them to “define cybersecurity in [their] 
own words, including what, specifically, 
cybersecurity is trying to secure.” 
Key insights
 Our experts agree that 
cybersecurity is a broad and 
contested notion.
 Thus, most of them refer to an 
essential core of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability 
of information as the key 
technical components of the 
cybersecurity definition.
 Context matters in defining 
cybersecurity: the definition 
should encompass nuances 
across scale, devices, actors, 
and types of risk.
 Framing also matters and 
should be included in the very 
definition of cybersecurity. 
Elements of human rights 
(notably privacy) and economics 
belong at the core of the notion. 
Our experts did not feel the definition  
should stop there, however, insisting instead 
that the definition should include context.  
For instance, our experts referred to concepts 
such as multiple devices (i.e., Internet of 
Things) or fundamental rights (e.g., privacy) 
to be key components in a comprehensive 
definition of cybersecurity. Finally, participants 
often noted that securing people was ultimately 
the objective of cybersecurity.
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Our experts also highlighted that 
‘cybersecurity’ was inherently a contested 
and broad notion and therefore subject 
to political instrumentalization. Some 
contrasted it with computer security, 
with, for example, a participant within the 
security segment explaining that the latter 
was “by itself more often concerned with 
tactics and the daily fight. Cybersecurity, 
on the other hand, is most often concerned 
with adjusting the environment and the 
underlying non-technical rules of the game 
in a manner in which actually changes  
the strategic, long term relationship 
between sides.”
 
“[In defining cybersecurity], 
the focus on technology 
and data is widely known 
and appealing, but 
ultimately the people 
aspects are most 
important.” 
 
“Cybersecurity includes protecting against 
device manufacturers who surreptitiously 
act against the wishes and interests of the 
device owner or user. A device with a hidden 
backdoor is insecure.”
Some participants suggested the difference 
between such terms was mostly political,  
with one expert arguing that cybersecurity  
and computer security were mostly 
synonyms, though cybersecurity was 
used “in government and military circles, 
including contractor and lobbyist circles”  
to connote that these questions were 
indeed a “tool and preoccupation of 
government.” This participant added: “it is 
worth noting that there are fundamentally 
different concerns and moral intuitions 
underlying different conceptions of security, 
including whose responsibility it is and 
whose interest it is meant to serve.” 1 
Finally, security of users should be viewed 
as the central focus of cybersecurity 
as noted by one expert in security: 
“cybersecurity secures not any one 
system but the ability to conduct business 
and continue operations in a routinely 
threatening electronic environment”.  
In that regard, one participant in civil 
liberties offered that cybersecurity needed 
to be thought primarily as any other 
form of human security: “When we talk 
about security for an individual or an 
organization, at the root, we are trying to 
defend the ability of that body to have the 
freedom, time and resources to achieve 
 
“Cybersecurity is trying to secure both 
access to data (privacy/confidentiality) 
and computer operations (i.e. against 
attacks that would change or stop those 
operations). I’d say the first category is 
more about the readability of the data, 
while writeability of the data falls more 
under the second category.” 
what it is they are meant to be doing, be 
that living daily life or accomplishing an 
important mission, without the interference 
of others.”
1  This panelist referenced an academic paper on the topic: Nissenbaum, Helen. “Where Computer Security Meets National Security1.” Ethics and Information Technology 7.2 (2005): 61-73.
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Users, tech  
& norms:
 
A broad picture of issues &  
levers in cybersecurity
Throughout rounds of our study, 
participants addressed a rich and diverse 
set of issues, demonstrating the many 
levers and priorities in the field of 
cybersecurity policy. When asked to focus 
on cybersecurity issues that should be a 
priority in the policy debate, they identified 
three solution vectors for a more secure 
digital world: the user environment, the 
technological environment, and finally the 
normative environment.
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Key insights
 People might be the problem, but blaming them isn’t the solution: 
our experts think there is much to be done to help the average 
person make the right security choices.
 Automating the patching of critical security updates arose often  
as a desirable way to achieve this goal.
 Generally, anything to encourage secure by default technology is 
going in the right direction, although there is room for debate on 
what secure tech by default encompasses.
The user 
environment
 
“The more you can take people out of 
the process, the better.” 
Delphi participants agreed that there is 
much to be done to make it easier for people 
to make better choices in their everyday 
computer practices. For instance, in the 
case of cryptography, four times as many 
experts expressed a desire to make tools 
easier or automatic for the average person, 
as opposed to solutions oriented towards 
more education on cryptography or teaching 
people how to use encryption tools. 2
Automation of security software updates 
in a manner that respects user autonomy 
was a popular and often discussed idea 
throughout the study was. A participant 
summarized the general tone of this 
conversation: “Patching of vulnerable 
software is probably the place to get 
the most immediate bang for the buck.”  
Others looked for historical comparisons:  
“[Perhaps we should consider] a degree of 
light-handed paternalism. For example,  
for major security updates, users should 
not necessarily bet presented by the option 
to install it, in the same way that children 
in the 1940s and the 1950s were required 
to get polio vaccines. We need to make it 
easier for users to make the right kinds  
of decisions.”
When we asked which changes to 
individual uses of computer systems – i.e., 
those typically used by laypeople in homes, 
offices, and public places – would have the 
biggest positive impact on cybersecurity, 
11 out of 32 respondents referred to 
automated patching. At least one person 
from each industry segment mentioned 
patching, but about half of the mentions 
came from the technology segment alone. 
2  Policy proposals to operationalize this idea included “Set up and fund open source task forces or working groups to make 
current security technology and services, notably cryptography, much easier to use for ordinary people” and “All things 
should be encrypted, push for greater use of cryptography.”
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It’s hard to operationalize this into specific 
policy solutions. When prompted for 
proposals they would like to see debated 
around the issue, our experts suggested: 
 Convening a working group on what 
is acceptable in terms of automated 
patching of known bad systems and how 
to deploy such measures; 
  Ensuring that firmware (notably in the 
Internet of Things and in routers) is easy to 
update through authenticated services; 3 
  Helping users make better decisions, 
notably vis-à-vis updates. For instance, 
“Do not ask ‘Do you wish to turn on 
automatic updates?’ but rather say, ‘If you 
are an ordinary user, you should click yes. 
It will ensure your system stays up to date 
with the latest security fixes.’”
Our experts often referred to the importance 
of education and user awareness, but also  
generally agreed that education could only  
go so far.  One expert shared this perspective: 
 
“Users are bad at security. This is no longer 
a hypothesis; it’s an absolute fact. We need 
to start building our security infrastructure 
around the idea that users have been and 
always will be our greatest security hole. 
We can’t rely on education to insulate them 
from attacks. We need to recognize that 
true systemic resilience needs to be able  
to exist in spite of users.” 
Several experts insisted on solutions to 
make the environment easier to navigate 
for the user and to deploy secure-by-default  
choices. “Secure by default,” however, 
inspires different thoughts among our 
experts. Where one sees “home computers 
becoming image offerings that are kept 
clean and updated”, another describes 
“computer systems shipped from the 
manufacturer with the security settings 
fully enabled to automatically detect 
unauthorized devices, unauthorized 
software, unauthorized access.”  
More thinking is needed about how to 
achieve wider deployment of solutions in 
this area. Most of the suggested actions 
revolved around supporting civil society 
and industry efforts that are already in 
motion in this area. 
 
“Take humans out 
of the loop as 
much as possible!” 
3  An additional source for inspiration was suggested by one of our experts here:  
http://www.nsf.gov/cise/news/CybersecurityIdeasLab_July2014.pdf
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Key insights
 Cryptography remains a priority: more needs to be done to deploy  
it widely and to make secure cryptographic tools easier to use.
 The public key infrastructure is a great source of concern: it should 
be “fixed asap!”
 Authentication stands as another hard problem to solve: policy 
should assist efforts to develop and deploy secure alternatives  
to passwords.
 Providing funding to sustain and supplement security efforts in free 
and open source software stands out as an obvious place to start. 
The technological 
environment
Among the many technological issues 
cybersecurity policy should focus on, three 
stood out as tough challenges, calling for 
concerted efforts from all stakeholders: 
the wide deployment of cryptography, the 
security of the public key infrastructure, 
and the implementation of secure 
authentication mechanisms. 
First, our experts have addressed the 
critical role played by cryptography in 
securing users, their computing and 
their communications. In that regard, 
cryptographic tools should be deployed 
more widely into existing systems, and 
tools to be used directly by people should 
be made much more accessible. Some 
frustration is apparent with recurring 
policy debates on cryptography, as much 
has been said on the policy trade-offs of 
cryptographic tools for law enforcement, 
but little progress is made to strengthen the 
state and deployment of cryptography. 
Making the public key infrastructure 
secure and ensuring the trustworthiness of 
certificate authorities (“CAs”) was also often 
noted by experts as both a tough problem 
to solve and a key priority for cybersecurity 
policy to take into consideration.4
4 Proposals targeted at this issue included “Improve the PKI infrastructure, ensure browsers do not rely on CA controlled 
untrusted parties.”
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Developing better identity management 
systems than passwords was another 
popular discussion topic that consistently 
ranked as a priority for better cybersecurity, 
especially for changes to individual use of 
computer systems.  Three quarters of our 
experts ranked this challenge among their 
top three priorities, and nearly one third as  
their number one priority for cybersecurity 
policy. Specific suggestions in this  
area included:
 Funding work and research to deploy 
alternatives to password; 
 Encouraging better authentication 
technologies (not subject to gatekeeper’s 
attacks) and examining incentives for  
wide adoption;
 Focusing on moving beyond default 
password configuration in the current 
CMS environment; and
 Providing some liability protection 
for companies using two factor 
authentication. 
Participants saw the funding of security 
audits of critical open source projects 
as a key unresolved and priority issue 
in cybersecurity policy. Indeed, funding 
for free and critical open source projects 
emerged as an interesting outlier in 
becoming the one issue perceived by all 
as both highly desirable and feasible in a 
government cybersecurity policy agenda. 
We believe the Heartbleed OpenSSL crisis 
may have contributed to this result, which 
demonstrates the desire for government 
involvement in cybersecurity policy in  
this area.5
 
“We need to make email encryption ubiquitous, and built into 
existing systems to make it as easy to use as secure HTTPS 
servers, i.e. fully transparent to the user. Securing web-based 
email is tricky but I’d like to see investments into inventing 
technology and email standards (via IETF) that could do it.”
5 For specific actions targeted at this issue, see for instance the Linux Core Infrastructure Initiative.
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Key insights
 Building norms for acceptable behavior in cyberspace was a popular 
priority for government action in cybersecurity across all segments 
of our expert group.
 Such norms should apply to governments, as well as to other 
stakeholders; corporations should also be concerned and involved  
in these efforts.
 Human rights should guide the building of such norms, and norms 
should be communicated and shared clearly and openly in the 
international arena. 
The normative 
environment
The building of better norms regarding 
behavior in cyberspace is sometimes 
portrayed as a primarily governmental 
concern - we saw quite the opposite with the 
study, as the proposition was popular and 
prioritized across all segments of our panel.
Norms had a slight edge over protection of 
trusted infrastructure by our experts as a 
priority issue for government involvement, 
and rated much higher in priority for policy 
action than enforcement of cybercrime, 
funding free and open software, notification 
of data breaches, incentives to the private 
sector, and public education. 
The normative environment is about the 
broadest label that could be applied to 
cybersecurity policy. To quickly summarize 
what we’ve learned, we could divide it 
into norms for everyday interactions in 
cyberspace, norms and expectations when 
cyber incidents occur, and international 
norms to prevent conflict escalation 
in cyberspace. Needless to say, these 
propositions do not span the universe of 
normative issues and topics in cyberspace; 
they simply reflect the ones that made it to 
the final stage of our study. 
Regarding norms for everyday interactions 
in cyberspace, propositions included: 
 Enacting better privacy laws;
 Changing the legal frameworks likely 
to provide a chilling effect for security 
and academic researchers ensuring that 
security researchers and entrepreneurs 
can tackle such questions without legal 
uncertainty;
 Allocating more resources to fight petty 
cybercrime; and 
 Requiring notification to customers 
when their personal information is 
compromised.
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For the management of cyber-incidents once 
they have occurred, we engaged our experts 
in a pseudonymous discussion analyzing 
the role of government through the example 
of the Sony hack. A lack of clarity over who 
in government was in charge of addressing 
such incidents was duly noted, with one 
participant suggesting a RACI chart for 
government involvement in cyber-incidents 
would be a good exercise to undertake. 
Cyber-hyping here too was pointed at as an 
unhelpful reaction:
“After report of criminal activity, the 
government’s role is to investigate, to 
secure the persons reasonably believed 
to have committed the offenses by arrest 
or extradition, to prosecute them, and 
to administer such penal sentences as 
the courts shall impose. When persons 
committing criminal offenses are agents 
or employees of foreign governments, 
the processes may be less certain in 
their effect, but the responsibility of the 
domestic government for law enforcement 
is neither reduced nor enlarged. Nothing 
about the events occurring with respect  to 
Sony changes any of those obvious points 
in any way. The effort to find something 
different in this situation is just cyber-
hyping, and should be resisted to the point 
of intentional efforts at abatement.” 
Our experts were very keen on discussing 
international norms. They felt that creating 
and communicating clear norms outlining 
acceptable behaviors in cyberspace while 
resisting the inflated cyber metaphors 
and taking human rights into strong 
consideration was a key priority for 
cybersecurity policy.6
The two word clouds above reflect what our 
experts feel gets too much attention in the 
public debate about cybersecurity (on the 
left), and what they feel does not get enough 
attention in the public debate (on the right). 7
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Cybersecurity issues getting too much attention in the public debate Cybersecurity issues not getting enough attention in the public debate
6 Policy proposals related to this included “Clearer norms, including taking human rights into consideration, to 
bound States’ activities in cyberspace” and “Publicly discuss and establish clear rules of the road on sensitive 
topics of government behaviors in cyberspace, and act in accordance with such rules.”
7 Exact questions to our experts were: “In the public debate, what ‘cybersecurity topic’ gets too much space and 
attention?” and “In the public debate, what ‘cybersecurity topic’ does not get enough space and attention?”
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Cryptography, 
information sharing, 
and the protection  
of critical 
infrastructure
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Key insights
 Participants with very different backgrounds identified cryptography, 
information sharing, and protection of critical infrastructure as  
high-priority cybersecurity policy targets.
 Cryptography runs through many different policy  
recommendations, as well as standing on its own as a priority,  
with participants citing the value of more usable and more 
ubiquitous cryptography technologies.
 Although information sharing is widely recognized as a policy  
target, some participants noted that the plethora of current 
mechanisms for information sharing has not converged into  
a fully functional framework.
 Protecting critical infrastructure is cited explicitly by many 
participants as a high priority target, as well as a natural role  
for government involvement.
The elephants of 
cybersecurity policy
Cybersecurity conversations are often 
dominated by three specific topics: 
cryptography, information sharing, and 
critical infrastructure. These are the issues 
we call the “elephants” in the room of 
cybersecurity. They are at the center of 
many policy dialogues - whether explicitly 
articulated or left silent, and they occupied a 
major place in our survey responses as well.
All three are fundamental to building 
security in the digital world, but, they must 
not be allowed to obfuscate the rest of the 
landscape. This section of our report brings 
the “cyberelephants” out into the middle 
of the room, so they can be isolated and 
analyzed on their own, and better separated 
from issues less developed and identified.
Cybersecurity is a complex landscape,  
and it’s challenging to keep all of the  
pieces in mind at once. It’s natural for  
a few to rise above others. The concepts 
that are important to the largest number 
of people, that have the longest and most 
well developed policy landscapes, and that 
are discussed the most often in media will 
dominate conversations because it’s much 
easier to focus on one or a few things than 
many, as it is the case with these three 
specific issues. 
From a segments perspective, cryptography  
is evenly noted by experts across all 
segments except from Government/Military, 
while information sharing and critical 
infrastructure are slightly more desirable 
among Technology and Government/Military.
 
These three “cyberelephants” emerged from 
our study as three of the most substantively 
important and frequently mentioned 
policy topics in cybersecurity. Without 
question, solving the myriad of problems 
inhabiting the cybersecurity landscape 
requires attention to improving the efficacy  
and ubiquity of cryptography; the design, 
baselines, and functionality of information 
sharing; and ample attention to the specific 
protection of critical infrastructure.
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Fortunately, these are all areas of active 
policy discussion and resource investment 
today. Legislation in the U.S. regarding 
information sharing is often controversial, 
but it has been in development for many 
years; in the meantime, private sector 
efforts have developed and promulgated. 
Websites of all stripes are moving to 
encrypted transport, just as user choices 
for secure communications abound more 
than ever before. Protection of critical 
infrastructure likewise remains  at the top 
of the priority lists of many policymakers. 
Yet, these “cyberelephants” often trample 
on other deserving cybersecurity policy 
priorities, or loom so large that it’s hard 
to see the other things that must be done 
to secure users and Internet infrastructure 
more broadly. The Mozilla Cybersecurity 
Delphi Project yielded 36 policy suggestions, 
only handful of which touch on these 
cyberelephants. 
As policymakers shift to a more holistic, 
comprehensive understanding of the 
problems and solutions of cybersecurity,  
we hope they will not only engage with 
these “cyberelephant” issues, but also 
explore the many other areas that our 
experts identified as priorities in need  
of further investment. 
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“Until we get the basics right, information sharing as a practice domain will be 
wildly more costly than its benefits will warrant. In the future, mature high 
functioning organizations that are able to understand themselves, where they 
are, and what their real risks are … will get a lot out of information sharing. 
At present, the list of those organizations is very short.”
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A way forward:
 
towards a user-centric & holistic 
approach to cybersecurity policy
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Throughout the four rounds of surveys and 
discussions of our Delphi project, there 
were no lack of problems and concerns for 
our experts to identify and diagnose. Poor 
cyber hygiene in government, misguided 
user behaviour, unacknowledged attack 
vectors, unreliable and widely deployed 
technology, all came up in due course.  
No shortage of issues, yet no clear path 
ahead: the cataloguing and evaluating of 
concrete cyber policy measures to increase 
user security in this context appeared  
to be a harder task than identifying what 
needed fixing. 
It seems as if with cybersecurity challenges 
multiplying and growing increasingly public 
and complex, the policy debate in this 
area is not fully engaging with the diversity 
of challenges. We designed the Delphi 
project in hopes that it could help complete 
the cybersecurity policy picture and to 
assist with the overdue update the field 
needs. Cybersecurity policy has long been 
dominated by recurring conversations, 
including conversations held in similar 
terms about policy trade-offs litigated more 
than twenty years ago, as some have noted 
about the case of law enforcement and 
cryptographic backdoors. We would like 
this project to help guide policy makers 
towards a more holistic, comprehensive 
understanding of the problems and 
solutions of cybersecurity.
The three issues that grouped together 
in our findings, those we called the three 
“cyberelephants,” represent the well 
charted grounds of cybersecurity policy and 
perhaps the longest running governmental 
conversations on cybersecurity. Privacy-
respecting information sharing policies, 
efficient critical infrastructure protection, 
widespread and secure encryption: these 
are key objectives for cybersecurity, hard 
goals to achieve and issues on which the 
policy contours have been largely identified 
and abundantly debated. They represent 
both fundamental topics for cybersecurity 
policy and the issues that are most likely to  
obfuscate the rest of the levers, problems and 
parameters in the cybersecurity landscape. 
Our process recognized the significance 
of these issues, but drawing on experts 
from a range of sectors and backgrounds, 
helped us dig deeper and produce a more 
nuanced and fulsome understanding of 
the cybersecurity problem and policy 
landscape. Differences in priorities, 
language and framing do appear between 
the segments (civil liberties, academia, 
technology, security and government & 
military) - as do common understandings 
across the segments, for instance with 
regard to the definition of cybersecurity 
and consensus for actions to prioritise, 
and in the case of security funding for free 
and open source software. This approach 
thus illuminates issues that appear as 
more consensual, desirable, or urgent 
than usually portrayed, as with the clear 
call for clear norms guiding stakeholder’s 
behaviour in cyberspace, the need to 
prioritise solutions to increase the security 
of the public key infrastructure, and the 
need for policies encouraging better 
authentication mechanisms. 
A user-centric cyber security policy agenda 
is one that provides people with, as one 
participant said, “freedom from fear of 
attack, unauthorised access or use of one’s 
identify, data, network or system - by 
anyone, for any reason, in any way.” It is 
a set of solutions that increases our global 
security without putting the burden on the 
user, by identifying solutions and levers  
that build a more secure world for all.  
We believe our Delphi project articulates 
and defines road markers on the way 
forward to such an agenda.
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The Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi Project 
began very broadly, asking 17 open- 
ended questions. After multiple steps  
of priority setting and discussions, our 
expert panel produced a long and wide  
list of cybersecurity policy suggestions  
and possible areas where government  
can play a role. 
As stated earlier in this report, the 
suggestions and possible solutions in 
itself is not the intended core focus, but 
rather the insights and transparent process 
involving a variety of industries and the 
willingness of a panel of experts to engage 
in a dialogue over this complex issue.
The following 36 cybersecurity policy 
suggestions, in no particular order, 
come from a balanced mix of experts 
across industry segments: 
Appendix A: Policy list
1   Better privacy laws.
2   Require notification to the 
customers when their personal 
information is compromised.
3   Better protect critical infrastructure, 
define sufficient security measures 
and audit critical sectors to ensure 
/ enforce that relevant private sector 
actors meet the requirements.
4   Provide some liability protection 
for companies using two-factor 
authentication.
5   Change the legal frameworks that 
provide a chilling effect for security 
researchers and academics, ensure 
that security researchers and 
entrepreneurs can tackle such 
questions without legal uncertainty.
6   Make all Government software 
free software and auditable, which 
would allow for more security in 
both the governmental and the non-
governmental users.
7   Create a safe (legal) environment for 
actors to share information with the 
public and the industry after  
cyber attacks.
8   Clearer norms, including taking 
human rights into consideration 
to bound States’ and companies’ 
activities in cyberspace.
9   Publish official guidelines and 
provide reference implementations 
addressing how can government 
bureaucracies and corporations 
better defend themselves.
10   Publish a clear international  
strategy to increase risks and 
consequences for adversaries 
attacking through cyberspace.
11   Develop a consensus framework to 
survey all the various problems that 
exist in the cybersecurity space.
12   Work to research and deploy 
alternatives to password, encourage 
authentication technologies that 
are subject to gatekeeper attacks, 
examine incentives for wide 
adoption. Help move beyond default 
password configurations in the 
current CMS environment.
13   Convene a working group on what 
is acceptable in terms of automated 
patching of known bad systems and 
how to deploy such measures.
14   Encourage better code-writing 
practices, design due diligence 
processes for security checks of 
written code and product assembly.
15   Have government agencies set up 
task forces or working groups to 
help organizations think through 
better systems for vulnerability 
management across their 
organizations.
16   More research on cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in engineering  
complex systems.
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17   Encourage Government and NGO 
to create labels / seals of approval 
for corporations and government 
services meeting certain security 
standards.
18   Encourage greater inter-
governmental coordination on cyber 
response (e.g. between state and 
federal levels in U.S.).
19   Ensure the intelligence community 
does not corrupt secure data 
standards.
20   Publicly discuss and establish 
clear rules of the road on sensitive 
topics of government behaviors in 
cyberspace, and act in accordance 
with such rules.
21   Encourage and support  
intra-governmental collaboration, 
partnerships and other trust 
building work to combat fracturing 
of efforts along national  
defense lines
22   Ensure firmware (notably in IoT, 
routers, etc.) is easy to update 
through authenticated service.
23   Develop federated compatible 
identity systems that are widespread 
and do not rely on government-
issued key.
24   Re-think basic Internet protocols 
from the ground up to build security 
at the core.
25   Improve the PKI infrastructure, 
ensure browsers do not rely on  
CA controlled by bad governments.
26   Help user make better decisions, 
notably vis à vis the updates. Do 
not ask, “Do you wish to turn on 
automatic updates?” but precise  
“If you are an ordinary user, you 
should click yes. It will ensure your 
system stays up to date with the 
latest security fixes.”
27   All things should be encrypted, push 
for greater use of cryptography.
28   More resources need to be allocated 
to fighting petty cybercrime, not just 
IP theft by other nations through  
cyber means.
29   More funding for development and 
maintenance of secure open source / 
free software tools, with a priority on 
critical and widely deployed projects.
30   Allocate more funds to independent 
research and development actors 
providing easy-to-use tools for 
cybersecurity and working on user 
awareness and education.
31   After each data breach, work on 
what are the best practices and 
procedures that could help prevent 
this in the future. Provide “This is 
what you should have done / this is 
what went wrong / this is what you 
should always do first / this is what 
you need to do every day” type of 
guidelines.
32   Widely deploy cybersecurity 
education in schools and in other 
aspects of Government programs.
33   Fund programs to educate users 
to use encryption and encrypted 
communications tools.
34   Structure a strong model to identify 
fundamental open source software 
resources and projects and fund 
proper security audits, allocating 
enough resources.
35   Set up and fund open source task 
force to make current security 
technology and services, including 
crypto, much easier to use for 
ordinary people.
36   Attract and adequately compensate 
people able to work within 
Government and with all parts of 
Government to ensure basic security 
is met throughout all services,  
ex. all .gov websites in HTTPS-only.
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Appendix B: Weighted scatterplot of all suggestion
The final step of the Delphi asked the panel 
of experts to rank their Top 5 Desirable 
and Top 5 Feasible issues from the full list 
of cybersecurity policy suggestions. A total 
of 27 experts engaged in this exercise, and 
while sample sizes may be small for any 
particular policy, some themes emerged 
in what our experts found desirable and 
feasible. The scatterplot applied a weighted 
score for both desirability and feasibility, 
thus Rank 1 was given the highest score 
and Rank 5 the lowest score.
Weighted score:
 
Numbers in the scatterplot correspond  
with the specific policy suggestions in 
Appendix A.
As a cautionary note, findings are not 
meant to be statistically generalizable to the 
general population of cybersecurity experts. 
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The Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi Study 
began with more than thirty leading 
experts in cybersecurity, and a significant 
majority stayed engaged throughout 
each step of the study. Below are some 
considerations of the Delphi Project, 
followed by a graph showing segment 
engagement in each major study phase: 
 The first phase of the Delphi (S1) involved 
the greatest number of participants (32), 
and contained the largest and widest 
range of responses. 
 Several participants from each 
industry segment did not participate 
in subsequent phases (S2 and S3), 
however, the segments remained evenly 
distributed as no one group saw large 
drop-off in any one phase. 
 The panel’s segments (academia, civil 
liberties, government & military, security, 
and technology) were fairly even in size at 
the start and end of the study, thus giving 
equal weight across segments. 
Appendix C: Participant engagement
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Note: The Delphi technique is often time consuming 
and it is not uncommon to see drop off in participation 
during the various stages of research.
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Kevin Babcock is Principal Security Engineer 
at PagerDuty, the leader in operations 
performance management. He has over 
15 years of experience in the information 
security field, including application security, 
authentication, encryption, Web security,  
anti-spam, and network security. He has 
worked with organizations such as Symantec, 
SafeWeb, and Box. Babcock holds a B.S. in 
Engineering and Applied Science from the 
California Institute of Technology, and is 
a Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP). 
Chris Camacho is the Security Vice President 
for Bank of America, responsible for malware 
response and the Bank’s Cyber Event 
Response Team (CERT). He previously worked 
at The World Bank Group to develop security 
technology initiatives, and was responsible for 
cyber intelligence within the Group. Camacho 
is a respected researcher in the information 
security community and an active member of 
the FS-ISAC Threat Intelligence Committee. 
Dr. Ron Deibert is Professor of Political 
Science and Director of the Citizen Lab at 
the University of Toronto’s Munk School of 
Global Affairs. The Citizen Lab focuses on the 
intersections between the Internet, security 
and human rights. Professor Deibert has 
authored numerous publications on these 
topics, and has consulted governments and 
organizations on related issues. He was 
appointed to the Order of Ontario in 2013, 
and awarded the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond 
Jubilee medal for being “among the first to 
recognize and take measures to mitigate 
growing threats to communications rights, 
openness and security worldwide.”
Andy Ellis is Akamai’s Chief Security Officer, 
responsible for overseeing the security 
architecture and compliance of the company’s 
massive, globally distributed network. He is 
the designer and patent holder of Akamai’s 
SSL acceleration network, as well as several 
of the critical technologies underpinning the 
company’s Kona Security Solutions. Andy is at 
the forefront of Internet policy; as a speaker, 
blogger, member of the FCC CSRIC, supporting 
Akamai’s CEOs on the NIAC and NSTAC, and 
an advisory board member of HacKid. He is a 
graduate of MIT and a former US Air Force officer, 
the recipient of the CSO Magazine Compass 
Award, the Air Force Commendation Medal, 
The Wine Spectator’s Award of Excellence, and 
the Spirit of Disneyland Award. 
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Marshall Erwin works for Mozilla as a 
senior staff analyst with a focus on data 
security, privacy and surveillance. Previously, 
he spent five years as a counterterrorism 
and cybersecurity analyst in the Intelligence 
Community. He also served as the 
counterterrorism advisor to Senator Susan 
Collins on the Senate Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee and as the 
intelligence specialist at the Congressional 
Research Services. He was a fellow at Stanford 
University’s Hoover Institution. Erwin holds an 
M.P.P. from Georgetown University, and a B.A. 
in philosophy and B.S. in computer science, 
both from Stanford University.
Adam Firestone is President and General 
Manager of KGSS, Inc., which provides 
cybersecurity intelligence, systems 
engineering services, and product solutions 
to government organizations. Firestone is also 
an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, 
a former United States Army Officer, and 
previously practiced law in the State of New 
York. He holds degrees from Yale University 
and Brooklyn Law School.
Dr. Matthew H. Fleming currently leads the 
cybersecurity resilience program of a large 
financial services firm in the United States. 
Having held positions with the U.S. Department 
of Defense, International Monetary Fund, and 
others, Fleming is also an adjunct professor at 
Georgetown University, with the McDonough 
School of Business and McCourt School of 
Public Policy.  He is a nonresident fellow with 
New America and the GW Center for Cyber & 
Homeland Security, and an advisor to the Tech 
Council of Maryland and Washington Cyber 
Roundtable.  He holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy 
from the University of London (University 
College London); a Master of Public Policy 
from the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor); 
and a B.A. in American Studies from  
Yale University.
Camille François served as the lead 
researcher for the Delphi project. Camille 
is a researcher, consultant and lecturer on 
cyber policy, with a focus on questions relating 
to cybersecurity, fundamental rights and 
state interactions in cyberspace. A Fellow 
at the Harvard Berkman Center for Internet 
and Society, Camille has also worked with 
organizations such as the U.S. Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
the French Prime Minister’s Office, Google  
and the French-American Foundation.  
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Rights from the French Institute of Political 
Sciences (Sciences-Po) and a Masters Degree 
in International Security from the School of 
International and Public Affairs at  
Columbia University. 
Nathan Freitas leads the Guardian Project, 
an open-source mobile security software 
project, and directs technology strategy and 
training at the Tibet Action Institute. His work 
at the Berkman Center focuses on tracking 
the legality and prosecution risks for mobile 
security apps users worldwide.
Joseph Hall works as the Center for Democracy 
and Technology’s Chief Technologist. He 
focuses on the intersection of law, technology, 
and policy and provides technical expertise 
to CDT’s efforts to ensure that the internet 
remains free and innovative. Previously, Hall 
was a postdoctoral research fellow at New 
York University, Princeton University, and the 
University of California, Berkeley. He received 
his PhD from UC Berkeley in 2008, where his 
doctoral thesis examined electronic voting as a 
case study in digital government transparency. 
He also holds master’s degrees in astrophysics 
and information systems. In 2012, the Election 
Verification Network honored Hall with the John 
Gideon Memorial Award for his work in the field.
Jonah Force Hill is an Adjunct Fellow with 
the Strategic Technologies Program at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS). He works, writes, and speaks on a 
variety of national and international Internet 
and cybersecurity policy issues. He has 
served as teaching fellow for the course 
“International Cybersecurity: Public and Private 
Sector Challenges” at Harvard University; as 
an intern, consultant, and researcher in the 
Office of the Cybersecurity Coordinator at the 
National Security Council; and as a research 
assistant to General David H. Petraeus (USA, 
ret.). His writings have appeared in numerous 
publications, including Lawfare, the Atlantic, 
Harvard’s National Security Law Journal, 
and the Georgetown University Journal of 
International Affairs. He holds an M.P.P. from 
the Harvard Kennedy School, an M.T.S. from 
Harvard Divinity School, and a B.A. from the 
University of California at Los Angeles.
Chris Ipsen is the State of Nevada’s Chief 
Information Security Officer and Chairman 
of Nevada’s State IT Security Committee. He 
previously served as Nevada’s Chief Enterprise 
Architect, CISO, and Chief IT Manager, in which 
position he created an enterprise system that 
saved Nevada $2.5 million over four years. He 
was named the  2015 CSO of the Year by SC 
Magazine. Ipsen received a bachelor’s degree 
in Public Administration from the University  
of Nevada, Reno.
Mischel Kwon is the President of security 
consulting firm MKA Cyber, which specializes 
in technical defensive security and information 
assurance. Kwon has close to 30 years 
of experience, and has served in many IT 
executive positions, such as Director of the 
United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT) and Deputy Director for IT 
Security Staff at the United States Department 
of Justice. She is an adjunct professor at 
George Washington University, and runs 
the institution’s Cyber Defense Lab. Kwon 
holds a master’s degree in computer science 
from Marymount University and a graduate 
certificate in Computer Security  
and Information Assurance.
Dr. James Andrew Lewis is a program 
director and senior fellow at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
His recent work focuses on cybersecurity, 
international security, and innovation.   
He maintains a close research partnership 
with the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations and advised the UN 
for the 2010, 2013 and 2015 negotiations 
on cybersecurity.  Lewis’ expertise is widely 
sought out by media outlets and leaders,  
with his report on “Cybersecurity for the 44th 
Presidency” receiving praise from President 
Obama. Lewis received his PhD from the 
University of Chicago.
Daniel Lohrmann has held numerous 
leadership positions related to cybersecurity 
and technology, including Chief Security Officer, 
Chief Technology Officer and Chief Information 
Security Officer for the State of Michigan. 
Lohrmann is currently the Chief Security 
Officer and Chief Strategist for Security 
Mentor, Inc., which provides online security 
awareness training. Lohrmann is a sought-
after author, blogger, and keynote speaker. He 
has given presentations at events worldwide, 
and writes a regular cybersecurity column for 
Government Technology magazine. He holds 
a master’s degree in computer science from 
Johns Hopkins University.
Shawn Lonergan is a Political Science PhD 
candidate at Columbia University and an 
active-duty major in the United States Army. 
He currently researches state interactions in 
cyberspace, cyber-ethics and security, and 
Internet governance. His past work includes a 
deployment to Iraq, work in cyber operations 
for the U.S. government, and studies at both 
Columbia University and the United States 
Military Academy at West Point, where he 
is now an instructor. Lonergan has been 
honored with numerous awards, including the 
Bronze Star and the Intelligence and Security 
Command MacArthur Leadership Award.
Jane Hall Lute is President and CEO of the 
Council on CyberSecurity Leadership and 
a member of the Department of Homeland 
Security Advisory Council. She previously 
served as the United States Deputy Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the United Nations Assistant 
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and the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission 
Support in the United Nations’ Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. Lute holds a PhD in 
Political Science from Stanford University and 
a J.D. from Georgetown University.
James Marshall is the founder, President,  
and Technical Director of the Berkeley Institute 
for Free Speech Online and a leading expert 
on circumventing Web censorship. Marshall 
has been involved in the development of the 
Internet since 1990 and designed the popular 
open-source anti-censorship software 
CGIProxy. In the mid-1990s, he played a role 
in developing the infrastructure of the Web by 
working on Web-related technical standards 
(RFCs) and writing influential tutorials on HTTP 
and CGI. Today, Marshall works through BIFSO 
to maintain CGIProxy while also supporting 
other anti-censorship projects.
Danny McPherson is Senior Vice President 
and Chief Security Officer of Verisign, where 
he manages all aspects of the company’s 
security. He has over 20 years of experience 
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task forces, boards and committees related 
to Internet operations and standardization. 
McPherson has authored several books, 
research papers, and numerous publications.
Eben Moglen is a Professor of Law and Legal 
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where he has taught since 1987, and also 
serves as Director-Counsel and Chairman of 
the Software Freedom Law Center. He has 
represented many prominent free software 
developers, and was awarded the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation’s Pioneer Award for his 
work toward freedom in electronic society. 
Professor Moglen received both his Law 
degree and a PhD in History from Yale 
University, and is admitted to practice in the 
State of New York and before the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Mark Nottingham is the Chair of the IETF 
HTTP Working Group, and an elected member 
of the W3C Technical Architecture Group. He 
also serves as the liaison manager between 
the two organizations and works for Akamai, 
the world’s largest public content delivery 
network. Nottingham has over fifteen 
years of experience in Web and technology 
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contributions to W3C Recommendations and 
IETF RFCs regarding web-related topics.  
He currently lives in Melbourne, Australia.
Brian Pascal is a nonresident fellow at 
Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and 
Society, where he focuses on the intersection 
of security, privacy and technology. His 
current research surrounds changes in 
power dynamics as a result of developing 
technologies. Pascal also has experience as 
a cybersecurity consultant with IBM, a civil 
liberties engineer with Palantir Technologies, 
and as an attorney. He completed his 
undergraduate studies in Physics at Duke 
University before studying science writing at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
earning his law degree from the University of 
Michigan Law School.
Dr. Abel Sanchez currently conducts research 
and teaches at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).  He specializes in topics such 
as Big Data, Simulation, and Complex Systems. 
His research has included projects with 
companies like Walmart, Ford Motor Company, 
and IBM. Dr. Sanchez also teaches graduate 
level courses in Cyber Security, Data Science, 
and Software Construction/Architecture at MIT, 
and earned his PhD from the institution.
Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned 
security technologist, called a “security 
guru” by The Economist.  He is the author 
of 12 books -- including the New York Times 
best-seller “Data and Goliath: The Hidden 
Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your 
World.” Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law 
School, a program fellow at the New America 
Foundation’s Open Technology Institute,  
a board member of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, and an Advisory Board member  
of the Electronic Privacy Information Center.  
He is also the Chief Technology Officer of 
Resilient Systems, Inc.
Seth Schoen has over 10 years of experience 
at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
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Sentencing Commission, the U.S. Copyright 
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Law School and a B.S. from Florida  
State University.
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Swartz has also worked as a researcher in  
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